UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

9-15-2021

State v. Fukji Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48640

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"State v. Fukji Respondent's Brief Dckt. 48640" (2021). Not Reported. 7222.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/7222

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
9/15/2021 1:31 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
MARK A. KUBINSKI
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
COLLIN SKIP H. FUKUJI,
Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 48640-2021 & 48641-2021
Cassia County Case Nos.
CR16-20-3935 & CR16-20-3977

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Collin Skip H. Fukuji failed to establish that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion?
ARGUMENT
Fukuji Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
A.

Introduction
Cassia County Sheriff’s Deputies were surveilling Collin Fukuji in August of 2020. (Conf.

Ex., p.2.) Over the course of several days they saw Fukuji associating with individuals under
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investigation for drug crimes, and, and one point, in a car parked by a house under “active federal
investigation” for drug trafficking. (Id.)
On August 13, 2020, an officer saw Fukuji, who himself “had been charged recently in
Nevada” for trafficking, leave the home of an individual with an active drug delivery case. (Conf.
Ex., p.3.) The officer observed Fukuji fail to signal on two occasions. After the officer attempted
to initiate a traffic stop, Fukuji “failed to pull over and a pursuit started.” (Id.) As the 17-minute
chase went on, Fukuji threw what appeared to be clear baggies out of the driver’s side window,
ran “numerous stop lights and stop signs,” and hit another vehicle after attempting to pass it. (Id.)
Fukuji did not stop after hitting the vehicle; instead “he powered through the accident and kept
going.” (Id.)
Fukuji drove to the Kodiak America manufacturing building, where he was formerly
employed, and ran inside. (Conf. Ex., pp.3, 10.) As Fukuji ran through the building he threw “a
black case across the floor to another employee,” who hid the case on a shelf. (Conf. Ex., p.4.)
After officers arrested Fukuji they recovered the black case and searched it, and found “two glass
pipes with white residue and a clear baggie containing a white crystal-like substance weighing 1.7
gram,” which tested presumptive positive for methamphetamine. (Id.) Officers also searched
Fukuji’s vehicle and recovered a loaded AR-15, a Sig Sauer 1911 handgun, multiple loaded
magazines, a digital scale with residue, multiple plastic baggies, and “[s]everal other weapons
including a baton, brass knuckles, a large bowie knife, a [balaclava], and tactical gloves.” (Id.)
The state charged Fukuji with one count of felony leaving the scene of an injury accident
in case no. CR16-20-3977. (48641 R., pp.25-27.) In case no. CR16-20-3935, now consolidated
on appeal (see 48640 R., p.106; 48641 R., p.92), the state charged Fukuji with felony fleeing or
attempting to elude an officer, possession of methamphetamine, felony concealment or destruction
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of evidence, possession of paraphernalia, and misdemeanor resisting and obstructing an officer.
(48640 R., pp.23-26.) Pursuant to a plea agreement with the state, Fukuji pleaded guilty to felony
eluding in case no. CR16-20-3935, and every other charge in that case was dropped. (48640 R.,
pp.40-56.) Fukuji also pleaded guilty to felony leaving the scene of an accident. (48641 R., pp.3450.) The district court sentenced Fukuji to five years, with one year fixed, in the eluding case, and
a consecutive five years, with one year fixed, in the leaving the scene case. (48640 R., pp.64-67;
48641 R., pp.54-59.) The court retained jurisdiction in both cases. (48640 R., p.67; 48641 R.,
p.57.) Fukuji timely appealed. (48640 R., pp.85-87, 101-05; 48641 R., pp.70-72, 87-90.)
Fukuji argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-9.) Review of the record and application of the
relevant legal standards shows no abuse of discretion.
B.

Legal Standard
Where “a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear

abuse of discretion by the court imposing the sentence.” State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368
P.3d 621, 628 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). To carry this burden the appellant must
show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is reasonable
if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve
any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The district court
has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when deciding upon
the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185
(1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of punishment,
deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “‘In deference to the
trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds
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might differ.’” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho
139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)). “Furthermore, ‘[a] sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial court.’”
Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
C.

Fukuji Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
Fukuji argues the lower court “did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards”

when it sentenced him because it “did not adequately consider mitigating factors.” (Appellant’s
brief, p.7.) Specifically, Fukuji claims the court “did not give adequate consideration” to his prior
criminal history, his “remorse and acceptance of responsibility,” and his “support from his friends
and family.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8.)
These arguments fail. The district court understood the “goals of sentencing” and the
criteria for placing defendants on probation, and it reviewed the PSI and the “attached letters from
[Fukuji’s] parents, former employer,” and ex-wife. (1/11/21 Tr., p.22, L.3 – p.23, L.4.) And the
court considered all of the mitigating evidence on offer, including Fukuji’s prior history, his
“meaningful” remorseful comments made at sentencing, and his family and community support.
(1/11/21 Tr., p.22, L.8 – p.28, L.15.) Indeed, the court noted that it was “incredible how well
respected” Fukuji was. (1/11/21 Tr., p.24, Ls.19-20.)
Nevertheless, the court also understood that Fukuji committed serious crimes. Fukuji was
fleeing from police, running red lights and stop signs, when he caused a car accident (from which
he also fled). (Conf. Ex., p.3.) One of the passengers in the car Fukuji hit was a “young man being
dropped off at football practice,” who ended up in the hospital. (1/11/21 Tr., p.24, Ls.7-9; Conf.
Ex., p.5.) Fukuji had methamphetamine, loaded firearms, tactical gloves, a balaclava, drug
paraphernalia, and a cache of other weapons in his car at the time of his arrest. (Id.)
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And while true that Fukuji’s former employer spoke highly of him, that support letter also
demonstrated a concerning downward spiral that preceded the arrest. Kodiak America’s general
manager reported that Fukuji “became associated with a local motorcycle gang” after his divorce.
(Conf. Ex., p.20.) “[H]e started using drugs,” started missing work, “became more angry and
belligerent with his crew members,” and “seemed to be coming apart at the seams.” (Id.) Fukuji
was given “chance after chance to recover and shape up” to no avail; “it became obvious that his
drug dependency was destroying his [judgment], his commitment, his behavior and his character.”
(Id.) “Some concluding incidences of anger and violence toward another Kodiak employee” were
the last straws that led to Fukuji’s termination. (Id.)
The same worsening trend can be seen in Fukuji’s criminal history. Fukuji went from
having only one decade-old misdemeanor on his record, to accruing the two felonies in the instant
case, as well being charged with felony drug trafficking in Nevada. (Conf. Ex., pp.12-13.) The
PSI also notes there “was a threat report from July 16, 2020, where [Fukuji] was the suspect in a
possible threat,” and had commented that “he had purchased an AR-15 rifle.” (Conf. Ex., p.3.)
And in this case, Fukuji violated his conditions of release by having prohibited contact with his
ex-wife. (Conf. Ex., p.13.) That is particularly troubling because, on August 5, 2020, Fukuji and
his ex-wife “had been in a domestic” situation, “where he used or had a firearm resulting in a
protection order being issued out of Cassia County.” (Conf. Ex., p.3.) According to his ex-wife’s
request for that order, Fukuji had “threatened to kill her and himself.” (Conf. Ex., p.8.)
Thus, the district court well considered the mitigating factors before it, but properly
weighed those against the aggravating factors. (1/11/21 Tr., p.22, L.3 – p.25, L.12.) The court
also correctly perceived that protection of society was the “number one,” “paramount concern,”
and in light of all the facts, concluded that a lesser sentence “would depreciate the seriousness of
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the offense.” (1/11/21 Tr., p.22, L.5 – p.25, L.12.) And Idaho’s appellate courts do “not presume
the district court did not consider the information before it, as the district court said it did,” nor
will they “reweigh the evidence on appeal from a discretionary sentencing decision.” State v.
Deboer, 168 Idaho 520, 484 P.3d 204, 208 (Ct. App. 2021) (citing State v. Windom, 150 Idaho
873, 879, 253 P.3d 310, 316 (2011)). This Court should not do so here.
Finally, the presentence investigator recommended, “based on the level of assessed need
and risk, and other protective factors,” that Fukuji “be sentenced to a period of retained
jurisdiction.” (Conf. Ex., p.14.) Given that recommendation, and the record that well supported
it, the district court reasonably concluded that a retained jurisdiction—which offered classes, skills
for Fukuji to learn, and “a forced period of sobriety”—was appropriate. (1/11/21 Tr., p.27, L.21
– p.28, L.2.) In light of the facts of this case and the information in the record Fukuji fails to show
the district court abused its sentencing discretion.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Fukuji’s judgment of conviction and
sentence.
DATED this 15th day of September, 2021.

/s/ Kale D. Gans
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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